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Abstract
Social engineering is a significant problem involving technical and nontechnical ploys in order to acquire
information from unsuspecting users. This paper presents an assessment of user awareness of such methods in
the form of email phishing attacks. Our experiment used a webbased survey, which presented a mix of 20
legitimate and illegitimate emails, and asked participants to classify them and explain the rationale for their
decisions. This assessment shows that the 179 participants were 36% successful in identifying legitimate emails,
versus 45% successful in spotting illegitimate ones. Additionally, in many cases, the participants who identified
illegitimate emails correctly could not provide convincing reasons for their selections.
Keywords
Social engineering, phishing, security awareness.

INTRODUCTION
Social engineering is a significant threat to the security of systems and data. Harl (1997) defines the technique as
“the art and science of getting people to comply with your wishes”, and numerous cases can be identified in
which related methods are used by attackers to assist in compromising a system or acquiring information. Social
engineering methods may be targeted against both organisational employees and private individuals, and a
notable aspect in which the problem has come to prominence in recent years is the threat of phishing. Indeed,
findings from the AntiPhishing Working Group suggest a growing threat, with 23,670 unique reports being
received in July 2006, as compared to 14,135 a year earlier (APWG, 2006). These scams not only represent a
problem to the unwitting recipients, but also an unwelcome threat to the reputations of the organisations and
brands that are impersonated. Unfortunately, as the attacks themselves have become more sophisticated, it has
become progressively more difficult for those targeted by phishing messages to distinguish them from genuine
correspondence. This can be directly related to advances in the social engineering and deception methods used
by the attackers.
This paper examines the extent to which endusers are susceptible to emailbased social engineering and
phishing threats. The discussion begins with a brief coverage of the psychological and technical ploys that may
be utilised to help fool a potential target into trusting an email message. From this foundation, the remainder of
the paper then presents details of a study conducted by the authors, in order to determine whether users can
distinguish between legitimate emails and illegitimate messages that attempt to employ some of the
aforementioned techniques. The results are presented and discussed, leading to conclusions about the
consequent difficultly of guarding against such attacks.

BACKGROUND
Social engineering may involve both psychological and technological ploys in order to leverage the trust of the
target. From the former perspective, the attacker can exploit characteristics of human behaviour in order to
increase the chances of the user doing what is desired. For example, Cialdini (2000) mentions that there are six
basic tendencies of human behaviour that may influence compliance with a request  namely authority, scarcity
(e.g. claiming that something is in short supply or available for a limited period only), liking, reciprocation,
commitment (consistency) and social proof (i.e. increasing the chances of a request being complied with by
claiming that other people have already done the same thing). Similarly, within the field of information

technology, Stevens (2000) refers to behavioural traits such as ‘conformity’ and the ‘desire to be helpful’, while
Jordan and Goudey (2005) refer to factors of ‘inexperience’ and ‘curiosity’ that may be exploited.. In phishing
attacks, these influential methods can be implemented through the technique of semantic deception (Fette at al.
2006) which is achieved through the language used in the text body of an email.
In the phishing context, psychological methods are often accompanied by further ploys achieved via technical
means. A phishing attack can often contain two main steps, a phishing email and a bogus web site. Hyperlinks
are typically included in the message text, with the URL redirecting the user to the bogus site in order to collect
sensitive information such as login credentials and financial details, or alternatively to download a malicious file
(Forte, 2005). Alternatively, an attacker may accompany a message with a malicious attachment in order to
exploit a vulnerable user system, with the text in the message body then being used to encourage the user to open
the attachment. This is a widelyutilised technique in the dissemination of malware such as worms and Trojan
horses, with a classic example being the Love Bug worm from May 2000, which fooled users into opening a
worm by pretending to be a love letter.
Visual deception in phishing attacks can be achieved through many ploys to make the email appear legitimate,
such as masking a fraudulent URL (Huseby, 2004) and stealing HTML code from a genuine web site in order to
create a bogus one by mirroring it (Drake et al. 2004). Images with banners and logos can also be used to create
a more plausible appearance. Further techniques that may be used to gain the user’s trust include spoofing the
email address of the sender, and presenting URLs that contain ‘https’ in the message to suggest a secure link.
Meanwhile, the bogus web site may contain plausible security indicators, such as the padlock icon to denote a
secure session (Dhamija and Tygar, 2005), and misusing images of security seals (such as the VeriSign and
TRUSTe logos).
The aim of the research was to assess users’ susceptibility to social engineering by mounting a survey to
investigate their knowledge of the associated ploys and techniques. In common with previous experiments in the
field (Robila and Ragucci, 2006; Dhamija et al. 2006) our investigation focused on the email part of the phishing
attack, and specifically on the criteria that participants used to identify such techniques.

INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY
The experiment was designed based on an online survey and it included two main sections. The first section
collected demographic details about respondents (e.g. gender, age, nationality, education and employment
background) and their Internet usage (e.g. use of online services such as shopping and banking, and any
mechanisms already used to guard against phishing threats). This was followed by the main body of the survey,
which consisted of 20 questions, each presenting the participant with an email message, and asking them to
judge its legitimacy. In each case, respondents could chose one of three options (‘illegitimate’, ‘legitimate’ and
‘don’t know’, with the latter being set as the default), and could optionally complete a text box to explain their
reasoning.
A range of email messages were used as the basis for the investigation, which represent a variety of both
legitimate correspondence that typical Internet users may receive, and a number of common email ploys used by
attackers. The 20 email questions were composed from 11 illegitimate and 9 legitimate messages, and were
gathered from a combination of websites showing phishingrelated examples, as well as emails that the authors
had personally received. The nature of the messages is summarised in Table 1 (with illustrative examples of four
of the actual messages being presented in Figures 1 to 4), which lists them in the order that they were presented
in the survey. In each case, the apparent source is indicated, alongside an indication of whether or not the
message was in fact genuine. The messages are then categorised according to various characteristics of their
appearance, all of which recipients may potentially use to aid their decision about whether to trust the content or
not:
•Identifiable recipient: Did the message include something that addressed the recipient by name or
some other characteristic (e.g. part of an account number) that could assist to verify whether or not the
sender was in possession of valid details about them?

•Identifiable sender: Did the message body indicate the name of a specific individual that a recipient
could attempt to contact (i.e. instead of a generic claim such as ‘XYZ security team’ etc).
•Images / logos: Did the message include graphical content that could help to improve the appearance,
emphasize brand identity, etc?
•Untidy layout: Was the message presented in an unprofessional manner (e.g. line breaks in the middle
of sentences)?
•Typos / language errors: Did the message contain any spelling mistakes or grammatical errors?
•URL / link: Did the message seek to encourage the recipient to follow a hyperlink?
The final column of the table indicates what the message was intending to convey – which, in the case of the
illegitimate messages, indicates the means by which it was attempting to deceive and persuade the recipient.
From an inspection of the table, it is clear that none of the appearancerelated characteristics could be regarded
as a definitive indicator of legitimacy.
Although characteristics such as untidy layout and
typographic/grammatical errors were only observed in illegitimate messages (and could therefore be used to
raise a recipients suspicion), their absence certainly did not mean that a message was genuine.

Question number and claimed
sender

Type of
message

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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Bank of America
NatWest Bank
Citibank
Chase Credit Cards
Cross Country Bank
Halifax Bank
Lloyds TSB
CapitalOne
Microsoft
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eBay
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eBay
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PayPal
Amazon
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Free Lottery
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Illegitimate
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Table 1: Summary of the email messages used in the study

Purpose of message
Notification of deposit.
Request for account verification
Opportunity to transfer credit card balances
Opportunity to transfer credit card balances.
Request to access online account in order to retain access.
Request for account verification.
Request for account verification.
Notification of account statement available for viewing.
Instructs recipient to download a security patch.
Annual confirmation request for domain name details.
Request for account verification.
Request to join eBay PowerSeller programme (sent to an unnamed
recipient).
Request to join eBay PowerSeller programme (sent to a named
recipient).
Claim of chargeback made to recipient’s account. Accompanied by
a malicious executable attachment.
Notification of payment.
Request (sent to named recipient) to update card details
Vishing scam
Request for tsunami disaster relief donation
Request for account verification.
Request for personal information in order to claim prize money.

Figure 1: Message 3 (legitimate)

Figure 2: Message 6 (illegitimate)

Figure 3: Message 11(illegitimate)

Figure 4: Message 19 (illegitimate)

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A total of 179 participants completed the survey over a period of 19 days. The requirements for someone to
participate to our study were the understanding of the English language (as the emails were written in English)
and the use of Internet. According to our findings the total population included 22 different nationalities and a
mix of gender (75% male and 25% female). Also, the majority of participants (97%) were higher educated
persons, with 76% in the 1829 range, and the remainder being 30+ years old.
Overall findings
Figure 5 depicts the overall responses observed for each question. One immediate observation is that, in most
cases, opinions were very much divided, with only a small number of cases in which respondents had a clear
majority view one way or the other (e.g. questions 3, 14, and 20). Furthermore, in some cases the majority view
was dramatically wrong (e.g. question 3). This clearly shows that many users typically face a hard task to
differentiate between a genuine email and a bogus one based upon the message content alone.
Don't Know

Illegitimate

Legitimate

100
90
80

Percentage %

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Leg

Ille

Leg

Leg

Leg

Ille

Ille

Leg

Ille

Leg

Ille

Ille

Leg

Ille

Leg

Leg

Ille

Ille

Ille

Ille

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Questions

Figure 5: Overall opinions for each of the 20 messages
The overall level of correct classification (i.e. indicating ‘legitimate’ for genuine messages and ‘illegitimate’ for
bogus ones) 42%, while misclassification was 32%. This, alongside the additional 26% of ‘don’t know’
responses, clearly illustrates the level of confusion amongst the participants. Analyzing subsets of the
participants based upon the demographics we established that there were no significant differences relating to
gender, age, or nationality. The results did, however, reveal that the participants were more prone to
misclassifying legitimate messages, potentially suggesting that the phishing threat (and possibly the survey
exercise itself) causes a heightened level of suspicion.

Legitimate messages

Correctly
classified
36

Incorrectly
classified
37

Illegitimate messages

45

28

26

Overall

42

32

26

Table 2: Classification of messages by participants

Don't Know
27

These findings can be compared to those from other experimental work. For example, Robila and Ragucci
(2006) discovered that, on average, their 48 participants were able to correctly identify 60% of legitimate
messages and 53% of illegitimate ones. However, it should be noted that this study used a different set of email
questions, and did not include the option for participants to select a ‘don’t know’ option, as was possible in our
case.
Rationale for judgments
According to the feedback comments (which were left by 89 participants) we were able to make a deeper
analysis by examining the participants’ judgment criteria in each case. A total of 1,653 distinct comments were
made, which were then grouped for analysis according to whether they related to the influence of visual factors,
technical cues, and language characteristics within the messages.
In terms of visual factors, we observed that 40 of the participants made judgments based on indicators such as
logos, banners, trademarks, footer, fonts and copyright symbols. From those participants, 55% used these
characteristics as a basis for deciding that the message was legitimate. It was also noted that participants were
more likely to regard a plain text (i.e. ASCII format) email as illegitimate (60%) than one in HTML formet that
included colour (40%).
From the perspective of technical cues, 52 participants made a judgment based upon the URL shown in the
message (with 70% selecting the ‘illegitimate’ option). Furthermore, 26 participants mentioned ‘http’ or ‘https’,
and 39 made a comment to suggest that they could use the URL for verification purposes by typing it directly
into a browser rather than clicking the link. Meanwhile, 40 participants made a selection based on the presence
of an email address.
From the investigation of language and contentrelated characteristics, we understood that 19 participants
focused on the language mistakes, such as typos and grammatical errors. Several observations were based upon
the level of personal (i.e. recipientspecific) information in the messages. For example, 18 participants made
reference to the presence (or absence) of the recipient’s name in the email, while 67 made comments based upon
the presence of other personal information (e.g. the 4 last digits from account numbers). Many participants also
focused upon the intention of the language used in the message. For example, 34 participants commented upon
emails that purported to relate to an offer or opportunity for the recipient, while 26 participants were influenced
by messages that used forceful language. Also from an analysis of influential techniques it seems that messages
that involve asserting authority or exploiting the recipient’s desire to be helpful are most likely to be
misclassified, compared to those attempting to exert influence based upon social proof or scarcity, which
participants were more able to classify correctly.

Technical

Visual

Judgment Criteria
Coloured email
Plaintext email
Logo/Trademark
Footnote
Copyright
There is https
There is no https
There is URL/Link
There in no URL/Link
Verification process
Manually URL check
Sender email address

Illegitimate

Legitimate

Mixed














Language and content

Personalized email (e.g.
recipient name)
Other personal data (e.g. 4
last digits)
Typos/grammar errors
Promoting offers /
opportunities
Using forceful language
Attempting to trigger desire
to be helpful
Asserting authority



Using social proof



Indicating scarcity










Table 3: Influence of different factors in determining decisions about message legitimacy
It was also notable that although visual factors, technical cues and language characteristics were often being used
as judgment criteria, participants were often arriving at incorrect decisions as a result. For instance, with the
illegitimate email used in Q6 (see Figure 2), which contained logo, footer and copyright symbol elements,
almost a quarter of the 39 participants who left comments used one or more of these factors to justify a choice of
‘legitimate’. Similarly, although many participants commented upon the technical cues within the emails, much
of their interpretation was wrong. As examples, we can consider the messages previously depicted in Figures 3
and 4. Figure 3 is an illegitimate email from eBay with spoofed email address (i.e. admin@ebay.reply
msg1223.com), while Figure 4 is an illegitimate email that includes a nonsecure URL for login
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/signin.html). However, several of the participants identified these factors
as aspects that increased their confidence.
Based upon the overall findings that we observed from the comments, Table 3 summarises the typical influence
of the various factors, indicating whether each was most commonly commented upon as a factor leading to a
judgement of legitimacy or illegitimacy. In some cases (where there was less than a two thirds majority
indicated in one way or the other) the influence of the factor was considered to be mixed, and thus it does not
have a clear role in leading participants to a legitimacy decision.

CONCLUSION
The practical study has enabled a deeper investigation of the phenomena of social engineering through phishing
attacks with emails, providing insight into the reasons that users become victims of such ploys. The resulting
need for increased security awareness is clear, but the way to achieve such awareness could be a difficult process
due to the technical unfamiliarity or the behavioural traits of each user.
It is recognized that our participants were only able to judge legitimacy on the basis for the content of the
messages, and were not able to assist their decisions by considering the context in which an email was received.
In practice, this aspect would very often aid a decision. For example, if a message asking for verification of
account details was received from a bank with which the recipient was not a customer, then this would typically
be a good indication that the message was bogus.
Another limitation in this study was that the candidate messages intermixed the different factors of interest (e.g.
use of visual indicators, styles of language, and technical cues). A more specific study of the influences that
each of these aspects may hold could be achieved if participants were specifically instructed to consider them in
isolation (i.e. purely based on the appearance of the message, is it legitimate or illegitimate?). As such, this
represents a potential aspect of future research. However, possibly the most important nearterm priority for the
industry in general is to ensure adequate awareness of, and action against, the phishing threat. This not only
applies to endusers who may receive the messages, but also the organizations that may find their brand being
hijacked.
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